Case 1

What is and isn’t a road? 

Based on where the “temporary” closure has taken place -

• one section that is a gazetted road (north of Cavill Ave), and
• another section that is not a road (south of Cavill Ave), comprising:
  • Council-owned freehold parcels (Lots 2, 3, 4 and 5 on RP21835), and
  • a DOGIT parcel (388WP4837) held by Council as Trustee for specific trust purposes.

It is likely different statutory processes apply to these two categories of land. The officer report refers only to Section 69 of the Local Government Act 2009, which applies only to roads.

Section 69 – where the land is still legally a road

Section 69(1) requires -

another road or route be reasonably available for use by the traffic.

The report argues the closure is lawful because Council impacts are “reasonable compared to the benefits”. This, however, is not what s69 requires. Instead, it requires an assessment of whether other roads or routes are reasonable for traffic to use. In my opinion, this would mean considering -

• capacity;
• long-term performance;
• resilience under peak and incident conditions; and• compliance with Council’s own Level of Service standards;

of other roads and routes. The officer report does not present this information, only some traffic speed and delay data during the trial period. Missing is -

Long-term Council traffic count data:

• The Esplanade carries ~15,000 vehicles/day
• Ferny Ave / Remembrance Dr (Gold Coast Hwy) carries ~36,000 vehicles/day
• A four-lane arterial typically reaches practical capacity at 30,000–40,000 vpd Council’s traffic demand forecasts (from LGIP):
• Coastal Core demand rising 68% (185,000 in 2025 → 312,000 trips/day in 2041) Council’s Transport Strategy Directions Paper (presented to Council 25 Nov 2025):
• Ferny Ave / Remembrance Dr forecast to operate at LoS E/F by 2046
• Link roads such as Thomas Dr and Via Roma forecast to operate at LoS E/F by 2046

In my opinion, a corridor forecast to operate below the City’s own standard cannot be considered “reasonably available”.

Further, the officer report mentions that Australia Day 2026 saw >2min increase in travel times on Ferny Ave / Remembrance Dr. This is a precursor of the future, not an anomaly.

Why this matters

If the statutory test requires another route be “reasonably available”, then the performance of that route must be demonstrated. This is a due diligence and risk management matter. If emergency access is delayed, or a fatality occurs because Surfers Paradise has been confined to a single failing spine, the question will be -

• Did Council knowingly create a foreseeable risk by removing redundancy?

Council’s own modelling makes the risk explicit.

Does Section 69 still apply? – where the land is not leagally a road.

Title searches confirm parts of the Esplanade are Council-owned freehold land, not dedicated road.

Historical records (including Gold Coast Council Annual Reports) indicate Council purchased these parcels in the early 1960s to construct a continuous Esplanade.

However, the land remains freehold, even though it has been used as a road-likecorridor for more than 60 years. This raises a number of procedural questions around how closure of this part of the Esplanade can occur if it’s not formally a “road”

• Does long-term public use create any formal public right-of-way?
• If the land is not legally a road, is Section 69 the correct statutory basis for approving a permanent closure?
• What is the correct statutory pathway for changing the use of Council freehold land?
• Has Council identified whether Ministerial approval is required for the DOGIT parcel?
• Has Council identified the correct approvals and due diligence required by the resolution?

The officer report makes no mention of this.

Final point

I want to be clear I am not opposed to increasing public open space in Surfers Paradise.

My concerns are simply -

• Is closing the Esplanade the right way to achieve this when it will create a significant road network resilience issue (impacting not just general traffic but public transport and emergency access)
• What part of the Esplanade will be permanently closed by the proposed resolution?
• Can such a decision be made while statutory and governance questions remain unresolved?
• Should deciding to permanently close the road be made before a decision to invest more than $100 million in turning the corridor into open space has not yet been confirmed?

Case 2

The details in Transport and infrastructure committee meeting agenda, starting at page 87, appear more like marketing materials and some of the numbers do not align with what is seen during busy periods.  Without fully reading the full contents, there appears to be no mention of public safety being paramount and this is a serious concern. Also there are no references anywhere that I can see that link to any external regulatory requirements. 

We have tried to find the said documents or references to the regulatory documents mentioned but were not successful in locating them but this does not mean that they do not exits it just indicates a lack of transparency.

If any of the documents do exists, then scrutiny of these documents would then be the next process. I do suspect that some possibly exist but I suspect that not all do. Those that do exist will most likely contain paid studies that will essentially be framed to support the entity that paid for them.

While the Surfers Paradise Esplanade project is being delivered at a local government level, the nature and scale of the risks identified—particularly those relating to emergency response, traffic impacts on State-controlled roads, and public safety in a tourism precinct—extend beyond the sole jurisdiction of local council.

As such, engagement directed exclusively toward council favourable entities is unlikely to result in substantive reconsideration at this stage of implementation, particularly where the project has progressed beyond consultation into delivery.

A more effective and appropriate approach is to ensure that relevant State and Federal stakeholders are formally notified, including:

• Queensland State Members of Parliament
• Relevant State Ministers (Transport, Emergency Services, Tourism)
• Federal representatives for the Gold Coast

These stakeholders have:

• Oversight of emergency services and State-controlled infrastructure
• Responsibility for public safety outcomes
• The capacity to initiate independent review or intervention where warranted

Importantly, formal notification ensures that the identified risks are placed on record at levels of government where accountability for systemic risk and public safety ultimately resides.

A formal paper trail is required to create a situation whereby, should a serious incident or tragedy occurs in the nightlife precinct, no politician will be able to claim they were never warned about the foreseeable risks.

This type of information placed in the hands of relevant State and Federal politicians, especially those who have already publicly stated that the road should be reopened would possibly provide the leverage needed as Politicians (especially State MPs and Ministers for Emergency Services, Transport, and Tourism) are highly sensitive to foreseeable risk and potential blame after a tragedy. Thus, documenting that they have been formally notified is essential.

Public Safety

Public safety must be the paramount consideration in the design, assessment, and implementation of any project affecting a high-density urban environment—particularly one characterised by:

• Large crowds
• Night-time economic activity
• Alcohol consumption
• High-rise buildings
• Constrained evacuation conditions

In such environments, established planning and emergency management principles require that safety is demonstrably prioritised above all other considerations, including amenity, tourism activation, or urban design outcomes.

For a project of this nature, this would ordinarily be evidenced through publicly accessible documentation, including:

• Detailed risk assessments
• Emergency response modelling
• Traffic impact and congestion modelling
• Multi-agency safety validation (QFES, QPS, TMR)

However, based on publicly available information, there is no clear or readily identifiable body of evidence demonstrating that safety has been assessed, modelled, and validated as the overriding priority in the permanent closure of the Esplanade.

While council materials reference community outcomes, activation benefits, and high-level safety statements, they do not appear to provide:

• Quantified risk analysis
• Scenario-based emergency modelling
• Demonstrated maintenance (or improvement) of emergency response times
• Independent verification by relevant State agencies
• References to any regulatory submissions

This creates a critical evidentiary gap.

If comprehensive safety and risk assessments have been undertaken, their absence from the public domain prevents independent scrutiny and undermines confidence in the robustness of the decision-making process.

If such assessments have not been undertaken to an appropriate standard, this raises serious concerns regarding whether the project meets expected safety, governance, and regulatory benchmarks.

In either case, the current level of disclosure does not demonstrate that public safety has been treated as the paramount consideration, as would be expected for infrastructure changes within a high-risk, high-density precinct.

Critical Safety and Emergency Response Risks

The permanent closure of a section of The Esplanade represents a serious threat to public safety and creates a foreseeable and unacceptable risk to human life in one of Australia’s busiest nightlife and tourism precincts. This area is characterised by dense nightclubs, bars, high-rise residential towers, and large numbers of intoxicated patrons — a combination that has proven deadly in many cities around the world when emergency access is compromised.

Real-world evidence during the trial closure has already revealed and exposed dangerous weaknesses:

• Emergency services have faced significant delays due to congestion on parallel routes.
• One documented incident during the trial involved firefighters having to proceed on foot to an apartment tower fire scare because engines were stuck in traffic just half a block away.
• Similar delays were reported during a Hilton Hotel rooftop fire.
• Traffic congestion: During the trial closure, there have been reports of severe delays (up to 3-hour jams in the suburb from minor incidents like accidents or truck rollovers), which could delay emergency vehicles.

If the Esplanade closure forces all traffic onto fewer parallel roads (like Orchid Avenue or Elkhorn), gridlock during a late-night incident could turn a containable event into something far worse. High-rises and dense entertainment precincts already present vertical evacuation challenges; horizontal access restrictions compound that.

When emergency vehicles need to access the closed section of The Esplanade, they are required to stop, open a gate, enter, and then presumably required to close the gate behind them. Even if all services hold keys, these extra seconds and minutes are unacceptable. In emergency situations, and in respect to response times, every minute can mean the difference between life and death.

Compounding these existing issues is the significant additional traffic pressure expected from the wave of high-rise developments currently underway in the Surfers Paradise area. Notably, the Cypress Palms development (under construction on Cypress Avenue near the Gold Coast Highway) will include Australia’s tallest apartment complex upon completion. This and other major high-rise projects will bring thousands of additional residents, vehicles, and visitors into an already constrained road network, further reducing the resilience of the remaining routes if The Esplanade remains permanently closed.

Queensland Police have also been regularly observed parking multiple vehicles in loading bays on Elkhorn Street, facing toward the closed section of the Esplanade on certain nights. This is particularly notable because the Surfers Paradise Police Station is located some 200mt away in Orchid Avenue. The repeated use of these Elkhorn Street loading bays rather than operating directly from their nearby station raises questions about the practical challenges and increased response times emergency services are facing as a direct result of the Esplanade closure and altered traffic flows.

These are not hypothetical risks. The global history of nightclub and entertainment venue fires proves how quickly situations can turn catastrophic when emergency access is delayed and these local incidents must be viewed against the long global history of nightclub and entertainment venue fires.

The below list below shows only incidents with 10 or more fatalities since 1950 (it does not include medical emergencies, stampedes, fights, or other events that also require rapid emergency access):

Karlslust dance hall, Berlin, Germany, 1947 — 81 deaths

Top Storey Club, Bolton, UK, 1961 — 19 deaths

Dale's Penthouse, Montgomery, Alabama, USA, 1967 — 26 deaths

Club Cinq-Sept, Saint-Laurent-du-Pont, France, 1970 — 146 deaths

Blue Bird Café, Montreal, Canada, 1972 — 37 deaths

Playtown Cabaret, Osaka, Japan, 1972 — 118 deaths

Whiskey Au Go Go, Brisbane, Australia, 1973 — 15 deaths

UpStairs Lounge, New Orleans, USA, 1973 — 32 deaths

Gulliver's nightclub, Port Chester, New York, USA, 1974 — 24 deaths

Time Club, Seoul, South Korea, 1974 — 64 deaths

Dance bar 6-9, La Louvière, Belgium, 1976 — 15 deaths

Puerto Rican Social Club, New York City, USA, 1976 — 25 deaths

Beverly Hills Supper Club, Southgate, Kentucky, USA, 1977 — 165 deaths

Fire at Stadt, Borås, Sweden, 1978 — 20 deaths

Denmark Place, London, UK, 1980 — 37 deaths

Stardust, Dublin, Ireland, 1981 — 48 deaths

Alcalá 20 nightclub, Madrid, Spain, 1983 — 82 deaths

Chowon (Greenfield) disco, Daegu, South Korea, 1983 — 25 deaths

Common People, Seoul, South Korea, 1984 — 10 deaths

Happy Land Social Club, Bronx, New York, USA, 1990 — 87 deaths

Flying nightclub, Zaragoza, Spain, 1990 — 43 deaths

Daegu Gosonggwan, Daegu, South Korea, 1991 — 16 deaths

Kheyvis, Olivos, Argentina, 1993 — 17 deaths

Yiyuan Disco, Fuxin, China, 1994 — 233 deaths

Ozone Disco, Quezon City, Philippines, 1996 — 162 deaths

Rolling Stones, Seoul, South Korea, 1996 — 11 deaths

Gothenburg discothèque, Gothenburg, Sweden, 1998 — 63 deaths

Incheon club, Incheon, South Korea, 1999 — 56 deaths

Luoyang Christmas, Luoyang, China, 2000 — 309 deaths

Lobohombo, Mexico City, Mexico, 2000 — 22 deaths

Volendam New Year's, Volendam, Netherlands, 2001 — 14 deaths

Myojo 56, Tokyo, Japan, 2001 — 44 deaths

Club La Guajira, Caracas, Venezuela, 2002 — 47 deaths

Utopía nightclub, Lima, Peru, 2002 — 29 deaths

The Station nightclub, West Warwick, Rhode Island, USA, 2003 — 100 deaths

República Cromañón nightclub, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004 — 194 deaths

911 nightclub, Moscow, Russia, 2007 — 10 deaths

Quito Ultratumba nightclub, Quito, Ecuador, 2008 — 15 deaths

Wuwang Club, Shenzhen, China, 2008 — 43 deaths

Santika Club, Bangkok, Thailand, 2009 — 67 deaths

Lame Horse, Perm, Russia, 2009 — 158 deaths

Kiss nightclub, Santa Maria, Brazil, 2013 — 242 deaths

Colectiv nightclub, Bucharest, Romania, 2015 — 64 deaths

Ghost Ship warehouse, Oakland, California, USA, 2016 — 36 deaths

Cuba Libre bar, Rouen, France, 2016 — 14 deaths

Hanoi karaoke bar, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2016 — 13 deaths

Magway karaoke bar, Magway, Myanmar, 2017 — 16 deaths

Yaoundé nightclub, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 2022 — 16 deaths

Sorong nightclub, Sorong, Indonesia, 2022 — 19 deaths

Mountain B nightclub, Sattahip, Thailand, 2022 — 26 deaths

Binh Duong karaoke bar, Bình Dương, Vietnam, 2022 — 32 deaths

Kostroma café, Kostroma, Russia, 2022 — 13 deaths

Fonda Milagros nightclub, Murcia, Spain, 2023 — 13 deaths

Gayrettepe (Masquerade) nightclub, Istanbul, Turkey, 2024 — 29 deaths

Hanoi karaoke bar, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2024 — 11 deaths

Kočani (Pulse) nightclub, Kočani, North Macedonia, 2025 — 63 deaths

Birch by Romeo Lane nightclub, Arpora, Goa, India, 2025 — 25 deaths

Crans-Montana bar, Crans-Montana, Switzerland, 2026 — 41 deaths

This history demonstrates recurring patterns of rapid fire spread, overcrowding, blocked or limited access, and the absolute necessity of immediate emergency vehicle access. Removing a major road and forcing reliance on gates and congested parallel streets directly contradicts the lessons from these tragedies. 

It is deeply concerning that a project carrying such obvious public safety risks has progressed this far with minimal transparent assessment and without what appears to be adequate risk assessment and independent scrutiny. It is truly hoped that Surfers Paradise does not end up on the above list.

Transparency Issues

Although the closure directly affects only a local Council road (The Esplanade), the project has significant external implications because displaced traffic flows onto the State-controlled Gold Coast Highway (including the Ferny Avenue section) and other major local routes. This triggers external requirements for TMR assessment of network impacts, QFES approval of emergency access plans, and potential environmental referrals at State and Federal levels.

Detailed technical studies (full Traffic Impact Assessments, Emergency Response Modelling, and Environmental Assessments) have not been made publicly available and if available are not readily identifiable by the public in general. If these studies showed the closure was safe, Council would likely have released them. Their absence raises serious questions about the thoroughness of the assessments.

Likely External Regulatory Requirements for the Surfers Paradise Esplanade Pedestrianisation Project would possibly involve, as a major alteration to the public road network in a high-profile tourism and nightlife precinct, the project is subject to several external (State and Federal) requirements in addition to local government responsibilities.

Emergency Services and Public Safety Requirements

Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES)

Formal input and approval of an Emergency Access and Evacuation Plan is required. This must demonstrate that response times for fire, ambulance, and police remain acceptable, especially during peak nightlife hours in a high-density entertainment precinct.

Queensland Police Service

Consultation on crowd management, event management, and public safety during major incidents or peak periods.

Traffic and Transport Requirements

Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) Input

Although The Esplanade itself is a local road, any significant adverse impact on the broader state-controlled road network requires consultation or formal assessment by TMR. Affected roads include:

Gold Coast Highway (including the section known locally as Ferny Avenue in Surfers Paradise) — this is a State-controlled road.

Other key impacted local roads: Orchid Avenue, Elkhorn Avenue, Cavill Avenue, and Beach Road.

Traffic Impact Assessment (TIA)

A comprehensive TIA evaluating network-wide effects (congestion, delays, and rerouting) is expected, particularly where traffic is displaced onto State-controlled roads such as the Gold Coast Highway/Ferny Avenue corridor.

State Network Integration

TMR review may be required if the project materially affects traffic volumes, safety, or operations on State roads.

Environmental Requirements

Environmental Impact Assessment

Depending on scale, a detailed environmental assessment covering coastal processes, stormwater management, sea-level rise adaptation, and biodiversity (beachfront vegetation) may be needed.

Commonwealth EPBC Act 1999

Referral to the Federal Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water is required if the project is likely to have a significant impact on Matters of National Environmental Significance (e.g., coastal environment, threatened species, or wetlands).

Queensland Environmental Offsets

Any required environmental offsets for vegetation clearing or habitat impacts.

Other External Requirements

Heritage

Assessment under the Queensland Heritage Act if any heritage-listed elements or places are affected.

Coastal Management

Compliance with the Queensland Coastal Plan and State Planning Policy for coastal hazard adaptation.

Disability Access / Inclusive Design

Compliance with external standards (e.g., Disability Discrimination Act) for public realm upgrades.

Availability of Supporting Technical Studies

Despite the scale and potential impacts of the Surfers Paradise Esplanade pedestrianisation project, several key technical documents do not appear to be publicly available as of May 2026. 

These include:
Comprehensive Traffic Impact Assessment (TIA) and network modelling reports evaluating long-term effects on State-controlled roads such as the Gold Coast Highway (Ferny Avenue section) and parallel local routes (Orchid Avenue, Elkhorn Avenue).

Detailed Emergency Access and Evacuation Plans, including response time modelling for fire, ambulance, and police in a high-density nightlife precinct.

Formal environmental assessments addressing coastal hazards, stormwater, and biodiversity impacts.

Council has published community consultation summaries, a high-level concept plan, and summary outcomes from the extended trial period. However, the underlying detailed technical studies that would normally support a project of this nature have not been released for public or independent scrutiny. This limits the ability of stakeholders to fully evaluate the robustness of traffic, safety, and environmental claims.